Software update systems must guarantee high availability, integrity and security even in presence of cyber attacks. We propose the first survivable software update framework for the secure distribution of confidential updates that is based on a distributed infrastructure with no single points of failure. Previous works guarantee either survivability or confidentiality of software updates but do not ensure both properties. Our proposal is based on an original application of a multi-authority attribute-based encryption scheme in the context of decentralized access control management that avoids single-point-of-vulnerability. We describe the original framework, propose the protocols to implement it, and demonstrate its feasibility through a security and performance evaluation.

Scalable, Confidential and Survivable Software Updates

Colajanni, M
2022

Abstract

Software update systems must guarantee high availability, integrity and security even in presence of cyber attacks. We propose the first survivable software update framework for the secure distribution of confidential updates that is based on a distributed infrastructure with no single points of failure. Previous works guarantee either survivability or confidentiality of software updates but do not ensure both properties. Our proposal is based on an original application of a multi-authority attribute-based encryption scheme in the context of decentralized access control management that avoids single-point-of-vulnerability. We describe the original framework, propose the protocols to implement it, and demonstrate its feasibility through a security and performance evaluation.
File in questo prodotto:
Eventuali allegati, non sono esposti

I documenti in IRIS sono protetti da copyright e tutti i diritti sono riservati, salvo diversa indicazione.

Utilizza questo identificativo per citare o creare un link a questo documento: https://hdl.handle.net/11585/906000
 Attenzione

Attenzione! I dati visualizzati non sono stati sottoposti a validazione da parte dell'ateneo

Citazioni
  • ???jsp.display-item.citation.pmc??? ND
  • Scopus 1
  • ???jsp.display-item.citation.isi??? 0
social impact