The extension of the Leitmann–Schmitendorf advertising game to n players and positive time discounting is investigated. We show that the strong time consistency of the open-loop Nash equilibrium is preserved. As to optimal controls, while the boundary solution is unaffected by the number of firms as well as discounting, the inner solution depends on industry structure. The fully symmetric version of the game allows us to identify the parameter regions wherein both solutions are sustainable.
The Leitmann-Schmitendorf Advertising Game with n Players and Time Discounting
DRAGONE, DAVIDE;LAMBERTINI, LUCA;
2010
Abstract
The extension of the Leitmann–Schmitendorf advertising game to n players and positive time discounting is investigated. We show that the strong time consistency of the open-loop Nash equilibrium is preserved. As to optimal controls, while the boundary solution is unaffected by the number of firms as well as discounting, the inner solution depends on industry structure. The fully symmetric version of the game allows us to identify the parameter regions wherein both solutions are sustainable.File in questo prodotto:
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