The essay develops an analysis aimed at verifying in the work of É. Durkheim the presence, specifically within his elaboration of the concept of organic solidarity, of a renewal – of a morphological nature, even more than of content – of some movements characteristic of Hegelian ethical life, with particular reference to the tension that can be found, within the Philosophy of Right, between the subjective and objective dimensions of freedom. The underlying purpose of the investigation is to show how for both Hegel and Durkheim the world of social relations constitutes the necessary place of emergence of freedom and solidarity and, therefore, of their first actualization through the evolution of right. The essay then argues how in both authors the relationship between solidarity and freedom is necessary for the enucleation of a concept of individuality – completely different from that proposed by modern individualistic rationalism – that finds in the knot of differentiation and bi-univocal relation to objectivity the ratio – graspable and recognizable by the citizen only through the mediation offered by the speculative action of the State – of the full actualization of the subject and her/his autonomy.
L’individualità nel nodo di differenziazione, relazione e istituzione. Echi concettuali tra la solidarietà organica di É. Durkheim e l’eticità hegeliana / Matteo Cavalleri. - In: FILOSOFIA POLITICA. - ISSN 0394-7297. - STAMPA. - 2:(2024), pp. 307-326.
L’individualità nel nodo di differenziazione, relazione e istituzione. Echi concettuali tra la solidarietà organica di É. Durkheim e l’eticità hegeliana
Matteo Cavalleri
2024
Abstract
The essay develops an analysis aimed at verifying in the work of É. Durkheim the presence, specifically within his elaboration of the concept of organic solidarity, of a renewal – of a morphological nature, even more than of content – of some movements characteristic of Hegelian ethical life, with particular reference to the tension that can be found, within the Philosophy of Right, between the subjective and objective dimensions of freedom. The underlying purpose of the investigation is to show how for both Hegel and Durkheim the world of social relations constitutes the necessary place of emergence of freedom and solidarity and, therefore, of their first actualization through the evolution of right. The essay then argues how in both authors the relationship between solidarity and freedom is necessary for the enucleation of a concept of individuality – completely different from that proposed by modern individualistic rationalism – that finds in the knot of differentiation and bi-univocal relation to objectivity the ratio – graspable and recognizable by the citizen only through the mediation offered by the speculative action of the State – of the full actualization of the subject and her/his autonomy.I documenti in IRIS sono protetti da copyright e tutti i diritti sono riservati, salvo diversa indicazione.