Income inequalities within societies are often associated with evidence that the rich are more likely to behave unethically and evade more taxes. We study how fairness views and preferences for redistribution are affected when cheating may, but need not, be the cause of income inequalities. In our experiment, we let third parties redistribute income between a rich and a poor stakeholder. In one treatment, income inequality was only due to luck, while in two others rich stakeholders might have cheated. The mere suspicion of cheating changes third parties’ fairness views considerably and leads to a strong polarization that is even more pronounced when cheating generates negative externalities.
Bortolotti, S., Soraperra, I., Sutter, M., Zoller, C. (2025). Too Lucky to be True: Fairness views under the shadow of cheating. THE REVIEW OF ECONOMICS AND STATISTICS, 107(3), 771-785 [10.1162/rest_a_01394].
Too Lucky to be True: Fairness views under the shadow of cheating
Stefania Bortolotti
;
2025
Abstract
Income inequalities within societies are often associated with evidence that the rich are more likely to behave unethically and evade more taxes. We study how fairness views and preferences for redistribution are affected when cheating may, but need not, be the cause of income inequalities. In our experiment, we let third parties redistribute income between a rich and a poor stakeholder. In one treatment, income inequality was only due to luck, while in two others rich stakeholders might have cheated. The mere suspicion of cheating changes third parties’ fairness views considerably and leads to a strong polarization that is even more pronounced when cheating generates negative externalities.| File | Dimensione | Formato | |
|---|---|---|---|
|
rest_a_01394-supp.pdf
Open Access dal 01/12/2024
Tipo:
File Supplementare
Licenza:
Licenza per accesso libero gratuito
Dimensione
584.36 kB
Formato
Adobe PDF
|
584.36 kB | Adobe PDF | Visualizza/Apri |
|
rest_a_01394.pdf
Open Access dal 01/12/2024
Tipo:
Versione (PDF) editoriale / Version Of Record
Licenza:
Licenza per accesso libero gratuito
Dimensione
2.39 MB
Formato
Adobe PDF
|
2.39 MB | Adobe PDF | Visualizza/Apri |
I documenti in IRIS sono protetti da copyright e tutti i diritti sono riservati, salvo diversa indicazione.


