The deterrence effect of police on crime has been well established using modern quasi-experimental micro-econometric methods. Although the results from these studies uniformly suggest that polices pending is cost justified, it is worth exploring whether police-like alternatives can deter crime even more cheaply. Unarmed private security personnel that conspicuously patrol a neighborhood have the potential to cheaply leverage the ability of police to be informed of crimes while also providing direct deterrence on their own. In the Fall of 2013, a neighborhood in Oakland, CA mounted a campaign to provide observe and report security patrols to augment the publicly provided policing in the area. While the initial effect of the additional security was a drop in crime, it quickly evaporated, calling into question the value of security forces that do not have the ability to apprehend criminals directly. (C) 2020 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.
Fabbri, M., Klick, J. (2021). The ineffectiveness of 'observe and report' patrols on crime. INTERNATIONAL REVIEW OF LAW AND ECONOMICS, 65, 1-9 [10.1016/j.irle.2020.105972].
The ineffectiveness of 'observe and report' patrols on crime
Fabbri, MCo-primo
;
2021
Abstract
The deterrence effect of police on crime has been well established using modern quasi-experimental micro-econometric methods. Although the results from these studies uniformly suggest that polices pending is cost justified, it is worth exploring whether police-like alternatives can deter crime even more cheaply. Unarmed private security personnel that conspicuously patrol a neighborhood have the potential to cheaply leverage the ability of police to be informed of crimes while also providing direct deterrence on their own. In the Fall of 2013, a neighborhood in Oakland, CA mounted a campaign to provide observe and report security patrols to augment the publicly provided policing in the area. While the initial effect of the additional security was a drop in crime, it quickly evaporated, calling into question the value of security forces that do not have the ability to apprehend criminals directly. (C) 2020 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.File | Dimensione | Formato | |
---|---|---|---|
observe_and_reportpatrols.pdf
Open Access dal 30/12/2022
Tipo:
Postprint
Licenza:
Licenza per Accesso Aperto. Creative Commons Attribuzione - Non commerciale - Non opere derivate (CCBYNCND)
Dimensione
740.51 kB
Formato
Adobe PDF
|
740.51 kB | Adobe PDF | Visualizza/Apri |
I documenti in IRIS sono protetti da copyright e tutti i diritti sono riservati, salvo diversa indicazione.