This work develops a theoretical framework for a behavioral policy against indirect tax evasion that is complementary to the classical deterrence approach. The policy provides incentives to customers in the form of lottery prizes in order to act as third-party tax enforcers. I argue that the policy introduction might successfully overcome the free-riding problem characterizing third-party tax enforcement. A theoretical model based on Tversky and Kahneman's (1992) Cumulative Prospect Theory is presented. The model states the necessary conditions for an effective policy implementation.
Fabbri M. (2015). Shaping tax norms through lotteries. INTERNATIONAL REVIEW OF LAW AND ECONOMICS, 44, 8-15 [10.1016/j.irle.2015.07.002].
Shaping tax norms through lotteries
Fabbri M.
Primo
2015
Abstract
This work develops a theoretical framework for a behavioral policy against indirect tax evasion that is complementary to the classical deterrence approach. The policy provides incentives to customers in the form of lottery prizes in order to act as third-party tax enforcers. I argue that the policy introduction might successfully overcome the free-riding problem characterizing third-party tax enforcement. A theoretical model based on Tversky and Kahneman's (1992) Cumulative Prospect Theory is presented. The model states the necessary conditions for an effective policy implementation.I documenti in IRIS sono protetti da copyright e tutti i diritti sono riservati, salvo diversa indicazione.
