In social and economic interactions, individuals often exploit informational asymmetries and behave dishonestly to pursue private ends. In many of these situations, the costs and benefits from dishonest behavior do not accrue immediately and at the same time. In this paper, we experimentally investigate the role of time on dishonesty. Contrary to our predictions, we find that neither delaying the gains from cheating nor increasing temporal engagement with one’s own unethical behavior reduces the likelihood of cheating. Furthermore, providing individuals with an excuse to lie by inserting a delay between the time when private information is obtained and when it is reported does not affect cheating.

Bortolotti, S., Kölle, F., Wenner, L. (2022). On the persistence of dishonesty. JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR & ORGANIZATION, 200, 1053-1065 [10.1016/j.jebo.2022.07.007].

On the persistence of dishonesty

Bortolotti, Stefania
;
2022

Abstract

In social and economic interactions, individuals often exploit informational asymmetries and behave dishonestly to pursue private ends. In many of these situations, the costs and benefits from dishonest behavior do not accrue immediately and at the same time. In this paper, we experimentally investigate the role of time on dishonesty. Contrary to our predictions, we find that neither delaying the gains from cheating nor increasing temporal engagement with one’s own unethical behavior reduces the likelihood of cheating. Furthermore, providing individuals with an excuse to lie by inserting a delay between the time when private information is obtained and when it is reported does not affect cheating.
2022
Bortolotti, S., Kölle, F., Wenner, L. (2022). On the persistence of dishonesty. JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR & ORGANIZATION, 200, 1053-1065 [10.1016/j.jebo.2022.07.007].
Bortolotti, Stefania; Kölle, Felix; Wenner, Lukas
File in questo prodotto:
File Dimensione Formato  
R2_JEBO_D_21_01679.pdf

embargo fino al 20/07/2025

Tipo: Postprint
Licenza: Licenza per Accesso Aperto. Creative Commons Attribuzione - Non commerciale - Non opere derivate (CCBYNCND)
Dimensione 905.24 kB
Formato Adobe PDF
905.24 kB Adobe PDF   Visualizza/Apri   Contatta l'autore

I documenti in IRIS sono protetti da copyright e tutti i diritti sono riservati, salvo diversa indicazione.

Utilizza questo identificativo per citare o creare un link a questo documento: https://hdl.handle.net/11585/891099
Citazioni
  • ???jsp.display-item.citation.pmc??? ND
  • Scopus 2
  • ???jsp.display-item.citation.isi??? 2
social impact