We model peer-to-peer real-time streaming as a multistage congestion game with strategies consisting of time-sequences of network nodes (or peers), and identify a large set of strategy profiles through which the whole content reaches all peers in a minimum number of time-periods. In order to make these profiles sustainable as equilibria, we provide strategy restriction mechanisms implementing those equilibria where both streaming duration and congestion are minimized. Their functioning is exemplified in a simple simulation environment. The potential and social cost of equilibrium without strategy restrictions are also investigated.
Equilibrium Selection in Multistage Congestion Games for Real-Time Streaming / G. Rossi; S. Ferretti; G. D'Angelo. - STAMPA. - (2009), pp. 1-10. (Intervento presentato al convegno International Workshop on Game Theory in Communication Networks (GAME-COMM 2009) tenutosi a Pisa nel October 23, 2009) [10.4108/ICST.VALUETOOLS2009.7633].
Equilibrium Selection in Multistage Congestion Games for Real-Time Streaming
FERRETTI, STEFANO;D'ANGELO, GABRIELE
2009
Abstract
We model peer-to-peer real-time streaming as a multistage congestion game with strategies consisting of time-sequences of network nodes (or peers), and identify a large set of strategy profiles through which the whole content reaches all peers in a minimum number of time-periods. In order to make these profiles sustainable as equilibria, we provide strategy restriction mechanisms implementing those equilibria where both streaming duration and congestion are minimized. Their functioning is exemplified in a simple simulation environment. The potential and social cost of equilibrium without strategy restrictions are also investigated.I documenti in IRIS sono protetti da copyright e tutti i diritti sono riservati, salvo diversa indicazione.
