We model peer-to-peer real-time streaming as a multistage congestion game with strategies consisting of time-sequences of network nodes (or peers), and identify a large set of strategy profiles through which the whole content reaches all peers in a minimum number of time-periods. In order to make these profiles sustainable as equilibria, we provide strategy restriction mechanisms implementing those equilibria where both streaming duration and congestion are minimized. Their functioning is exemplified in a simple simulation environment. The potential and social cost of equilibrium without strategy restrictions are also investigated.
G. Rossi, S. Ferretti, G. D'Angelo (2009). Equilibrium Selection in Multistage Congestion Games for Real-Time Streaming. BRUSSELS : ICST [10.4108/ICST.VALUETOOLS2009.7633].
Equilibrium Selection in Multistage Congestion Games for Real-Time Streaming
FERRETTI, STEFANO;D'ANGELO, GABRIELE
2009
Abstract
We model peer-to-peer real-time streaming as a multistage congestion game with strategies consisting of time-sequences of network nodes (or peers), and identify a large set of strategy profiles through which the whole content reaches all peers in a minimum number of time-periods. In order to make these profiles sustainable as equilibria, we provide strategy restriction mechanisms implementing those equilibria where both streaming duration and congestion are minimized. Their functioning is exemplified in a simple simulation environment. The potential and social cost of equilibrium without strategy restrictions are also investigated.I documenti in IRIS sono protetti da copyright e tutti i diritti sono riservati, salvo diversa indicazione.