Two parties bargain over a pie, the size of which is determined by their previous investment decisions. Investment costs are heterogenoeus. The bargaining rule is sensitive to investment behavior. Our main result is that egalitarianism is more likely to emerge in situations in which private property over the fruits of one’s own independent investment is not secured.

Negroni Giorgio, Bagnoli Lidia (2019). Egalitarianism: an evolutionary perspective. METROECONOMICA, 70(1), 24-44 [10.1111/meca.12225].

Egalitarianism: an evolutionary perspective

Negroni Giorgio
;
2019

Abstract

Two parties bargain over a pie, the size of which is determined by their previous investment decisions. Investment costs are heterogenoeus. The bargaining rule is sensitive to investment behavior. Our main result is that egalitarianism is more likely to emerge in situations in which private property over the fruits of one’s own independent investment is not secured.
2019
Negroni Giorgio, Bagnoli Lidia (2019). Egalitarianism: an evolutionary perspective. METROECONOMICA, 70(1), 24-44 [10.1111/meca.12225].
Negroni Giorgio; Bagnoli Lidia
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Utilizza questo identificativo per citare o creare un link a questo documento: https://hdl.handle.net/11585/654863
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