Two parties bargain over a pie, the size of which is determined by their previous investment decisions. Investment costs are heterogenoeus. The bargaining rule is sensitive to investment behavior. Our main result is that egalitarianism is more likely to emerge in situations in which private property over the fruits of one’s own independent investment is not secured.
Negroni Giorgio, Bagnoli Lidia (2019). Egalitarianism: an evolutionary perspective. METROECONOMICA, 70(1), 24-44 [10.1111/meca.12225].
Egalitarianism: an evolutionary perspective
Negroni Giorgio
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2019
Abstract
Two parties bargain over a pie, the size of which is determined by their previous investment decisions. Investment costs are heterogenoeus. The bargaining rule is sensitive to investment behavior. Our main result is that egalitarianism is more likely to emerge in situations in which private property over the fruits of one’s own independent investment is not secured.File in questo prodotto:
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