The distributive justice norm of âjust desertsââi.e. the notion that one gets what one deservesâis an essential norm in a market society, and honesty is an important factor in economic and social exchange. We experimentally investigate the effect of violations of the distributive justice norm of âjust desertsâ on honesty in a setting where behaving dishonestly entails income redistribution. We find that the violation of the just deserts norm results in a greater propensity toward dishonesty. We then test a more general proposition that violations of just deserts induce dishonesty, even in cases where dishonesty does not have redistributive consequences. Our results confirm this proposition but only for cases in which the violation of just deserts also entails income inequality.
Galeotti, F., Kline, R., Orsini, R. (2017). When foul play seems fair: Exploring the link between just deserts and honesty. JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR & ORGANIZATION, 142(C), 451-467 [10.1016/j.jebo.2017.08.007].
When foul play seems fair: Exploring the link between just deserts and honesty
Galeotti, Fabio;Orsini, Raimondello
2017
Abstract
The distributive justice norm of âjust desertsââi.e. the notion that one gets what one deservesâis an essential norm in a market society, and honesty is an important factor in economic and social exchange. We experimentally investigate the effect of violations of the distributive justice norm of âjust desertsâ on honesty in a setting where behaving dishonestly entails income redistribution. We find that the violation of the just deserts norm results in a greater propensity toward dishonesty. We then test a more general proposition that violations of just deserts induce dishonesty, even in cases where dishonesty does not have redistributive consequences. Our results confirm this proposition but only for cases in which the violation of just deserts also entails income inequality.File | Dimensione | Formato | |
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