'Logic, considered as Semeiotic'. On Peirce's Philosophy of Logic

In his later years, Peirce devoted much energy to the project of a book on logic, whose intended title was “Logic, considered as Semeiotic.” That the science of logic is better considered as semeiotic is indeed one of the most fundamental tenets of Peirce’s mature philosophy of logic. But what is the primary motivation for considering logic as semeiotic and what advantages did Peirce see in doing so? If logic is to be consid-ered as semeiotic, this can only mean that its objects and their functioning are to be described in purely semeiotical terms. But did Peirce succeed in providing such a de-scription? This paper focuses on the semei-otical functioning of the fundamental triad of logic: terms (rhemes), propositions (dici-signs), and arguments; it also discusses the idea of an extension of the science of logic and offers examples of the kind of extension that Peirce had in mind.