We analyse the screening problem of a firm hiring workers without knowing their ability while observing their intrinsic motivation. We show that volunteerism is the contractual outcome when workers are low-skilled, have high motivation, and are protected by limited liability.
Burani, N., Palestini, A. (2016). What determines volunteer work? On the effects of adverse selection and intrinsic motivation. ECONOMICS LETTERS, 144, 29-32 [10.1016/j.econlet.2016.04.014].
What determines volunteer work? On the effects of adverse selection and intrinsic motivation
BURANI, NADIA;PALESTINI, ARSEN
2016
Abstract
We analyse the screening problem of a firm hiring workers without knowing their ability while observing their intrinsic motivation. We show that volunteerism is the contractual outcome when workers are low-skilled, have high motivation, and are protected by limited liability.File in questo prodotto:
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volunteerEL_appendix_accepted.pdf
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burani_economics letters.pdf
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