OMNIS VOLENS IPSUM SUUM VELLE VULT. ON A THEORY OF INCONTINENTIA IN ANSELM'S THOUGHT

In Anselm of Canterbury's work we can't find an explicit theory about incontinentia or weakness of will, also when the topic – as in the case of De libertate arbitrii, for example – could be suitable for this kind of argument. However it's possible, in our opinion, to locate and retrace that we could define an implicit and original anselmian theory of incontinentia, different from Ancient Greek accounts (those proposed by Socrates, Plato, and especially by Aristotle in his examination of akrasia in Nicomachean Ethics VII) as well as from the theories of incontinentia put forth by e.g. Paul and Augustine in late antiquity, and later on by patristic writers such as Gregory the Great and Lanfranc of Canterbury. We consider the notion of rectitudo what specifically sets apart Anselm’s theory from these accounts and we thus examine its implications, particularly those related to the concepts of will and of freedom of will (libertas arbitrii). Following this analysis, we offer what we might call a “modal theory of will”, expressed at both a linguistic and a semantic level through the use of adverbial terms. On this account, we propose to understand the many problems raised by the issue of weakness of will in terms of the different modes according to which incontinent individuals produce their acts of volition.