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EnglishWithin a simple model of homogeneous oligopoly, we show that the traditional ranking between Bertrand and Cournot equilibria may be reversed. For price setting entails a continuum of price equilibria under convex variable costs, departure from marginal cost pricing may be observed. As a consequence, Bertrand–Nash equilibrium profits (welfare) may be higher (lower) than Cournot–Nash ones. The reversal of the standard rankings occurs when pricing strategies mimic collusive behaviour.
| Titolo: | Bertrand versus Cournot with convex variable costs | |
| Autore/i: | DELBONO, FLAVIO; LAMBERTINI, LUCA | |
| Autore/i Unibo: | ||
| Anno: | 2016 | |
| Rivista: | ||
| Digital Object Identifier (DOI): | http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s40505-015-0072-x | |
| Abstract: | Within a simple model of homogeneous oligopoly, we show that the traditional ranking between Bertrand and Cournot equilibria may be reversed. For price setting entails a continuum of price equilibria under convex variable costs, departure from marginal cost pricing may be observed. As a consequence, Bertrand–Nash equilibrium profits (welfare) may be higher (lower) than Cournot–Nash ones. The reversal of the standard rankings occurs when pricing strategies mimic collusive behaviour. | |
| Data stato definitivo: | 2020-03-26T11:00:18Z | |
| Appare nelle tipologie: | 1.01 Articolo in rivista |
File in questo prodotto:
| File | Descrizione | Tipo | Licenza | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Bertrand versus Cournot preprint.pdf | Preprint | Licenza per Accesso Aperto. Creative Commons Attribuzione - Non commerciale (CCBYNC) | Open Access Visualizza/Apri |
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