L’approccio fenomenologico alla scienza cognitiva. Le forme della conoscenza tra Leibniz e Husserl

In this paper I try to show that some elements of Leibniz’s thought are notable and still useful in contemporary trends of cognitive science connected with the phe-nomenological approach. Such an approach, that directly comes from Husserl re-flections, offers new perspectives in which it is possible to consider cognitive subject, conscious phenomena and the conscious aspects of thought. This is especially true for situated, embodied and enactive cognition. In particular, I deal with perception, an aspect of cognition that is very important for both Leibniz and Husserl. My thesis is that the dichotomy between analysis and synthesis (in mathematics, logics and general theory of knowledge) leads Leibniz to powerful and fruitful ideas on perception, that are close to enactivism, emergence, and the overcoming of the limitations and the problems raised by a pure dualistic view of subject and object, something that we can also find in the phenomenological approach to mind and cognition.