Wittgenstein's Grammar of Emotions

Abstract In his later writings, Wittgenstein devoted a great deal of energy to the analysis of emotions. Between March and December 1947, he organized his remarks into a «classification of psychological concepts», in which emotions have a determinate place. This classification was not of course intended as a conclusive theory of psychology, but as a guide for the philosophical treatment of psychological concepts in general, and of emotions in particular. Following Wittgenstein’s classifications, in this paper I outline the main features of what one might call Wittgenstein’s «philosophy of emotions» in the context of his general method of philosophical investigation. Special prominence will of course be given to the two volumes of the Remarks on the Philosophy of Psychology (1947-1948), which contain his most extended and careful analysis of the matter. I argue that, since Wittgenstein conceived philosophy as a grammatical activity, his philosophy of emotions is, more precisely, a grammatical investigation into emotions.