Between Philosophy of Mind and Metamathematics: the Metaphysics of disproportion in Nicolas of Cusa

Is Nicholas of Cusa’s neglect of Aristotelian logic and a theory of substance that is both underlying and, at the same time, dependent on that logic sufficient to say that metaphysics disappears from his thought? The answer is, of course, in the negative. In the following, I will attempt to illustrate the characteristics of what could be called a metaphysics of mind rather than being, which is linked in Nicholas of Cusa’s writings both to mysticism and to a measuring theory. Metaphysica paupera, mathesis, metamathesis, are non-asseverative knowledge, linked to a problematic nature, insufficiency, movement, shadow, rather than to the solidity and density of ontology, recognizable in those fields in which the disproportion between mensura and mesuratum, i.e., between the infinite and the finite, is most evident.