Do not give bribes in honor: Pochesf and vziatka in post-Petrine Russia

This article explores the nature and extent of corruption in early modern Russian state administration, arguing that the issue extends beyond mere academic interest. In traditional societies, much of governance relies not on laws and regulations but on customs, routines, and everyday administrative practices. The interaction between "old" and "new" administrative practices is key, especially as Russia transitioned to more modern management systems. Local officials, both before and after Peter the Great’s reforms, often relied on gifts and bribes rather than salaries. This article questions whether such practices should be labeled as "corruption" or merely as a legacy of the "feeding" system. It also examines the legal measures against bribery in the 17th to early 18th centuries, highlighting the difficulties in combating these entrenched traditions. Historians have differentiated between "honorary gifts" and illegal bribes, noting that while bribery was widespread, it was often hidden and difficult to regulate. The article further analyzes the role of passive and active resistance among peasants in the face of corrupt practices, proposing that the concept of "soft legal restrictions" could explain the systemic nature of legal violations. By shifting the focus from the actions of officials to the interactions between them and the population, the article aims to shed light on the evolving framework of governance and its implications in Russia during the early modern period.