One of the main enabling reforms included in the Italian National Recovery and Resilience Plan is that of competition. In this regard, past pro-competitive attempts have usually disappointed expectations, above all due to the counter-mobilization of very powerful interest groups, able to act as veto-players in the policy process. This article seeks to contribute to the literature on the influence of Italian interest groups by focusing precisely on the pro-competition reforms in two highly politically salient policy sectors: unscheduled public transport services and beach concessions. Specifically, we want to make a triple comparison: between policy sectors, between subsequent stages of the policy cycle and between governments, focusing on the lobbying strategies deployed by the interests affected by the measures being considered. We interpret empirical findings on the basis of a detailed reconstruction of the policy processes, drawing on several interviews with privileged observers.
GERMANO Luca, MONTALBANO Giuseppe, PRITONI Andrea (2024). Still waiting for the 'liberal revolution'? The Italian pro-competition law and the cases of taxi licences and beach concessions. CONTEMPORARY ITALIAN POLITICS, 16(1), 74-91 [10.1080/23248823.2023.2299064].
Still waiting for the 'liberal revolution'? The Italian pro-competition law and the cases of taxi licences and beach concessions
MONTALBANO Giuseppe;PRITONI Andrea
2024
Abstract
One of the main enabling reforms included in the Italian National Recovery and Resilience Plan is that of competition. In this regard, past pro-competitive attempts have usually disappointed expectations, above all due to the counter-mobilization of very powerful interest groups, able to act as veto-players in the policy process. This article seeks to contribute to the literature on the influence of Italian interest groups by focusing precisely on the pro-competition reforms in two highly politically salient policy sectors: unscheduled public transport services and beach concessions. Specifically, we want to make a triple comparison: between policy sectors, between subsequent stages of the policy cycle and between governments, focusing on the lobbying strategies deployed by the interests affected by the measures being considered. We interpret empirical findings on the basis of a detailed reconstruction of the policy processes, drawing on several interviews with privileged observers.I documenti in IRIS sono protetti da copyright e tutti i diritti sono riservati, salvo diversa indicazione.