Until recently, it would have been tautological to say that the question of assessing inde- pendence did not arise when the preliminary ruling instrument was activated by a national judge: judges in the Member States were presumed to be independent. However, in the context of the rule of law backsliding, with the adoption of national laws aimed at undermining the guarantee of inde- pendence and making the judiciary subject not only to the law but also to the executive, the Court of Justice was obliged, in the Getin Noble Bank judgment, to limit this presumption in cases where there is a final judgment of a national court or of the ECHR which gives rise to a presumption of infringement of art. 19(1) TEU and art. 47 of the EU Charter. The L.G. judgment is a landmark decision, as it is the first time that the Court of Justice has overturned the “presumption of independence” on the grounds that the Polish Chamber for Extraordinary and Public Affairs cannot be considered a judicial body within the meaning of art. 267 TFEU, due to irregularities in the procedure for the ap- pointment of its members. The aim of this Insight is twofold: firstly, to analyse the facts of the case, the context in which the reference is made, the arguments of the AG and the Court's decision, high- lighting its new elements, especially in relation to ECHR jurisprudence; secondly, to examine the systemic impact of the judgment.
Miriana Lanotte (2024). La chiusura del dialogo “giudice a giudice” come extrema ratio nella sentenza L.G. c Krajowa Rada Sadownictwa. EUROPEAN PAPERS, 9(1), 275-286.
La chiusura del dialogo “giudice a giudice” come extrema ratio nella sentenza L.G. c Krajowa Rada Sadownictwa
Miriana Lanotte
2024
Abstract
Until recently, it would have been tautological to say that the question of assessing inde- pendence did not arise when the preliminary ruling instrument was activated by a national judge: judges in the Member States were presumed to be independent. However, in the context of the rule of law backsliding, with the adoption of national laws aimed at undermining the guarantee of inde- pendence and making the judiciary subject not only to the law but also to the executive, the Court of Justice was obliged, in the Getin Noble Bank judgment, to limit this presumption in cases where there is a final judgment of a national court or of the ECHR which gives rise to a presumption of infringement of art. 19(1) TEU and art. 47 of the EU Charter. The L.G. judgment is a landmark decision, as it is the first time that the Court of Justice has overturned the “presumption of independence” on the grounds that the Polish Chamber for Extraordinary and Public Affairs cannot be considered a judicial body within the meaning of art. 267 TFEU, due to irregularities in the procedure for the ap- pointment of its members. The aim of this Insight is twofold: firstly, to analyse the facts of the case, the context in which the reference is made, the arguments of the AG and the Court's decision, high- lighting its new elements, especially in relation to ECHR jurisprudence; secondly, to examine the systemic impact of the judgment.I documenti in IRIS sono protetti da copyright e tutti i diritti sono riservati, salvo diversa indicazione.