We investigate the welfare effects of third-degree price discrimination by a two-sided platform that enables interaction between buyers and sellers. Sellers are heterogeneous with respect to their per-interaction benefit, and, under price discrimination, the platform can condition its fee on sellers’ type. In a model with linear demand on each side, we show that price discrimination (i) increases participation on both sides, (ii) enhances total welfare, and (iii) may result in a strict Pareto improvement, with both seller types being better off than under uniform pricing. These results, which are in stark contrast to the traditional analysis of price discrimination, are driven by the existence of cross-group network effects. By improving the ability to monetize seller participation, price discrimination induces the platform to attract more buyers, which then increases seller participation. The Pareto improvement result means that even those sellers who pay a higher price under discrimination can be better off, because of the increased buyer participation.

Alexandre de Cornière, A.M. (2024). Third-Degree Price Discrimination in Two-Sided Markets. MANAGEMENT SCIENCE, online first, 1-17 [10.1287/mnsc.2023.02788].

Third-Degree Price Discrimination in Two-Sided Markets

Andrea Mantovani;
2024

Abstract

We investigate the welfare effects of third-degree price discrimination by a two-sided platform that enables interaction between buyers and sellers. Sellers are heterogeneous with respect to their per-interaction benefit, and, under price discrimination, the platform can condition its fee on sellers’ type. In a model with linear demand on each side, we show that price discrimination (i) increases participation on both sides, (ii) enhances total welfare, and (iii) may result in a strict Pareto improvement, with both seller types being better off than under uniform pricing. These results, which are in stark contrast to the traditional analysis of price discrimination, are driven by the existence of cross-group network effects. By improving the ability to monetize seller participation, price discrimination induces the platform to attract more buyers, which then increases seller participation. The Pareto improvement result means that even those sellers who pay a higher price under discrimination can be better off, because of the increased buyer participation.
2024
Alexandre de Cornière, A.M. (2024). Third-Degree Price Discrimination in Two-Sided Markets. MANAGEMENT SCIENCE, online first, 1-17 [10.1287/mnsc.2023.02788].
Alexandre de Cornière, Andrea Mantovani, Shiva Shekhar
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Utilizza questo identificativo per citare o creare un link a questo documento: https://hdl.handle.net/11585/976318
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