Online intermediaries greatly expand consumer information, but also raise sellers’ marginal costs by charging high commissions. To prevent disintermediation, some platforms adopted price parity and anti-steering provisions, which restrict sellers’ ability to use alternative sales channels. Whether to uphold, reform, or ban these provisions has been at the center of the policy debate, but, so far, little consensus has emerged. As an alternative, this paper studies how to cap platforms’ commissions. The utilitarian cap reflects the Pigouvian precept according to which the platform should charge net fees no greater than the informational externality it exerts on other market participants.

Renato Gomes, Andrea Mantovani (In stampa/Attività in corso). Regulating Platform Fees under Price Parity. JOURNAL OF THE EUROPEAN ECONOMIC ASSOCIATION, on line first, 1-46 [10.1093/jeea/jvae014].

Regulating Platform Fees under Price Parity

Andrea Mantovani
Secondo
In corso di stampa

Abstract

Online intermediaries greatly expand consumer information, but also raise sellers’ marginal costs by charging high commissions. To prevent disintermediation, some platforms adopted price parity and anti-steering provisions, which restrict sellers’ ability to use alternative sales channels. Whether to uphold, reform, or ban these provisions has been at the center of the policy debate, but, so far, little consensus has emerged. As an alternative, this paper studies how to cap platforms’ commissions. The utilitarian cap reflects the Pigouvian precept according to which the platform should charge net fees no greater than the informational externality it exerts on other market participants.
In corso di stampa
Renato Gomes, Andrea Mantovani (In stampa/Attività in corso). Regulating Platform Fees under Price Parity. JOURNAL OF THE EUROPEAN ECONOMIC ASSOCIATION, on line first, 1-46 [10.1093/jeea/jvae014].
Renato Gomes; Andrea Mantovani
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Utilizza questo identificativo per citare o creare un link a questo documento: https://hdl.handle.net/11585/969437
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