Countries you go, asylum adjudication you find”. Asylum appeals implementation arrangements, actors’ discretion and organizational practices.

The article investigates the implementation of a crucial area of the EU asylum policy, which is asylum adjudication at the appeal stage. According to the Common European Asylum System (CEAS), Member States must guarantee asylum seekers an effective remedy against first- instance decisions. However, the EU policy framework leaves space for each country to choose its implementation model. Filling a gap in the literature on asylum policy implementation, the article explores the implementation arrangements for asylum appeals in three countries, Italy, France, and Greece, which adopt different models. More precisely, relying on Strategic Analysis of Organizations (Crozier 1963; Crozier and Friedberg 1977) and the Street-Level Bureaucracy (SLB) approach, the article addresses how specific elements of the implementation arrangement influence organizational autonomy, implementing actors’ routines and perceptions, as well as the degree of discretion. Moreover, it investigates the influence of de facto organizational practices on policy performance. The analysis of qualitative data suggests that different implementation arrangements, such as the nature of the body, the appointment system, and mechanisms of vertical accountability, shape de facto individual and organizational practices and actors’ spaces for discretion. This process seems to impact policy performance, particularly in terms of uniformity, which is a core objective within the broader European policy framework for asylum adjudication.