We formally study two bidder first-price, second-price, and all-pay auctions with known values, deriving the equilibrium payoffs and strategies and showing when all three yield the same equilibrium payoffs to the bidders. This latter result, the tripartite auction theorem, does not hold for all auctions, in particular it can fail for symmetric auctions with high stakes and in auctions with very low stakes.

Levine D.K., Mattozzi A., Modica S. (2024). The tripartite auction folk theorem. EUROPEAN ECONOMIC REVIEW, 162, 1-12 [10.1016/j.euroecorev.2023.104656].

The tripartite auction folk theorem

Levine D. K.;Mattozzi A.;Modica S.
2024

Abstract

We formally study two bidder first-price, second-price, and all-pay auctions with known values, deriving the equilibrium payoffs and strategies and showing when all three yield the same equilibrium payoffs to the bidders. This latter result, the tripartite auction theorem, does not hold for all auctions, in particular it can fail for symmetric auctions with high stakes and in auctions with very low stakes.
2024
Levine D.K., Mattozzi A., Modica S. (2024). The tripartite auction folk theorem. EUROPEAN ECONOMIC REVIEW, 162, 1-12 [10.1016/j.euroecorev.2023.104656].
Levine D.K.; Mattozzi A.; Modica S.
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Utilizza questo identificativo per citare o creare un link a questo documento: https://hdl.handle.net/11585/960691
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