Within the institutional architecture for financial supervision within the EU, courts coexist with quasi-courts, i. e., review bodies like the ESAs Joint Board of Appeal, the SSM’s Administrative Board of Review (ABoR) and the SRB’s Appeal Panel. This has parallels e. g. US Administrative Law Judges (ALJs). Some argue that this flight away from courts is justified because administrative law and procedure are more flexible. Yet administrative mechanisms are deceptively simple. This paper offers a cautionary tale about the complexities of all quasi-judicial arrangements and their competing and complementary role with courts and presents an analysis of the European framework from both a functional and a comparative perspective.
a promise kept? the first ears of experience of the appela panel of the SRB
marco lamandini;david ramos
2023
Abstract
Within the institutional architecture for financial supervision within the EU, courts coexist with quasi-courts, i. e., review bodies like the ESAs Joint Board of Appeal, the SSM’s Administrative Board of Review (ABoR) and the SRB’s Appeal Panel. This has parallels e. g. US Administrative Law Judges (ALJs). Some argue that this flight away from courts is justified because administrative law and procedure are more flexible. Yet administrative mechanisms are deceptively simple. This paper offers a cautionary tale about the complexities of all quasi-judicial arrangements and their competing and complementary role with courts and presents an analysis of the European framework from both a functional and a comparative perspective.I documenti in IRIS sono protetti da copyright e tutti i diritti sono riservati, salvo diversa indicazione.
