In light of the experience we surmise that, in the EU law of finance, both for European courts and the BoA and AP the question is not about changing the standards of review as they stand; it is about ensuring that the standard of legality review is meaningfully applied, because the reviewing court or quasi court is capable of engaging in a dialogue with the supervisory institution in its own terms and challenge its reasoning, having due regard to all factual elements of the case. What kind of error of assessment counts as ‘manifest’ cannot be determined independently of the Court’s understanding of what falls within the acceptable range, which, in turn, cannot be established without reference to the court’s willingness to take an hard, or better said, closer look at all factual and legal elements of the reasoning. Thus, albeit with nuances often determined by the specific features of each case, in the supervisory and resolution context it seems to us that the marginal v full review debate is, in the Banking Union, more academic than practical and that a full assessment of facts, to the extent that procedural rules allow a proactive evidentiary role, Q&A and expert witness, and a stringent review of the interpretation and application of law (and thus of the substantive legality) is possible, and thus full legal accountability and full effective judicial protection is warranted.
marco lamandini, david ramos (2022). Some Reflections on the Standard of Review in the Experience of the ESAs Joint Board of Appeal and of the SRB Appeal Panel. EUROPEAN COMPANY AND FINANCIAL LAW REVIEW, 19(6), 950-970.
Some Reflections on the Standard of Review in the Experience of the ESAs Joint Board of Appeal and of the SRB Appeal Panel
marco lamandini;david ramos
2022
Abstract
In light of the experience we surmise that, in the EU law of finance, both for European courts and the BoA and AP the question is not about changing the standards of review as they stand; it is about ensuring that the standard of legality review is meaningfully applied, because the reviewing court or quasi court is capable of engaging in a dialogue with the supervisory institution in its own terms and challenge its reasoning, having due regard to all factual elements of the case. What kind of error of assessment counts as ‘manifest’ cannot be determined independently of the Court’s understanding of what falls within the acceptable range, which, in turn, cannot be established without reference to the court’s willingness to take an hard, or better said, closer look at all factual and legal elements of the reasoning. Thus, albeit with nuances often determined by the specific features of each case, in the supervisory and resolution context it seems to us that the marginal v full review debate is, in the Banking Union, more academic than practical and that a full assessment of facts, to the extent that procedural rules allow a proactive evidentiary role, Q&A and expert witness, and a stringent review of the interpretation and application of law (and thus of the substantive legality) is possible, and thus full legal accountability and full effective judicial protection is warranted.I documenti in IRIS sono protetti da copyright e tutti i diritti sono riservati, salvo diversa indicazione.