Fenómeno vs. Fenomenalidade. Husserl e Natorp no pano de fundo de um debate atual

Does phenomenology allow us to pave the way for a privileged understanding of phenomena? A glance at the philosophical history of the concept of phenomenon is enough to confront us with complex results. We need only mention two: the definitions of what a “phenomenon” is vary both within and outside the phenomenological tradition; the phenomenological understanding of phenomena has been subject to various objections, especially since Husserl, and continues to be so in the current debate. We will therefore focus on the dialogue between Husserl and Natorp in order to demonstrate the originality of the Husserlian approach through Natorp’s critique of the Logical Investigations. These critiques allow us to articulate a twofold strategy consisting of a direct confrontation with Husserl’s positions; an indirect parallel with some of the arguments we find today in the philosophy of mind and the cognitive sciences, where, besides the concept of phenomenon, other apparently related concepts appear. The first of these is “phenomenality”, which would indicate the purely subjective character of experience. Our aim is twofold: to counter Natorp’s objections by focusing on Husserl’s logical investigations; to defend the specificity of the phenomenological understanding of phenomena in the light of the current debate.