Esserci o aversi? Il problema dell’io alla luce dei primi corsi friburghesi del giovane Heidegger

Is it possible to conceive of the “who” of Dasein independently of the connection that in Sein und Zeit links the Werfrage to the Seinsfrage? This question, paradoxical as it may seem, has historical and conceptual legitimacy if we consider the “phenomenological anthropology” that the young Heidegger develops in his first Freiburg Lectures (1919/20) through a rigorous critique of Natorp’s Allgemeine Psychologie. In criticising Natorp, Heidegger nevertheless ends up admitting a tension between the self, facticity, and existence. And this enables us to highlight the problematic nature of the relationship that binds ipseity to the world, within which the formulation of the Werfrage finds its condition of possibility.