We study how the organization of the state evolves over the process of development of a nation, using a new dataset on the internal organization of the U.S. federal bureaucracy over 1817-1905. First, we show a series of facts, describing how the size of the state, its presence across the territory, and its key organizational features evolved over the nineteenth century. Second, exploiting the staggered expansion of the railroad and telegraph networks across space, we show that the ability of politicians to monitor state agents throughout the territory is an important driver of these facts: locations with lower transportation and communication costs with Washington DC have more state presence, are delegated more decision power, and have lower employee turnover. The results suggest that high monitoring costs are associated with small, personalistic state organizations based on networks of trust; technological shocks lowering monitoring costs facilitate the emergence of modern bureaucratic states.
Mastrorocco, N., Teso, E. (2023). STATE CAPACITY AS AN ORGANIZATIONAL PROBLEM. EVIDENCE FROM THE GROWTH OF THE U.S. STATE OVER 100 YEARS. Cambridge, MA 02138 : National Bureau of Economic Research [10.3386/w31591].
STATE CAPACITY AS AN ORGANIZATIONAL PROBLEM. EVIDENCE FROM THE GROWTH OF THE U.S. STATE OVER 100 YEARS
Mastrorocco, Nicola
Co-primo
;
2023
Abstract
We study how the organization of the state evolves over the process of development of a nation, using a new dataset on the internal organization of the U.S. federal bureaucracy over 1817-1905. First, we show a series of facts, describing how the size of the state, its presence across the territory, and its key organizational features evolved over the nineteenth century. Second, exploiting the staggered expansion of the railroad and telegraph networks across space, we show that the ability of politicians to monitor state agents throughout the territory is an important driver of these facts: locations with lower transportation and communication costs with Washington DC have more state presence, are delegated more decision power, and have lower employee turnover. The results suggest that high monitoring costs are associated with small, personalistic state organizations based on networks of trust; technological shocks lowering monitoring costs facilitate the emergence of modern bureaucratic states.I documenti in IRIS sono protetti da copyright e tutti i diritti sono riservati, salvo diversa indicazione.