Somaesthetics and Embodied/Enactive Philosophies of Mind

In this article I focus on Jerold J. Abrams’ recently edited volume on Richard Shusterman’s somaesthetics and I assume as a starting point the concept itself of soma, widely cited and examined in various contributions collected in Abrams’ book. Then, I specifically concentrate my attention on one of the essays, the one authored by Stefán Snævarr, which connects in an interesting, original and sometimes also challenging way Shusterman’s thinking to some questions that have characterized the current debates in the field of the philosophy of mind. On this basis, in the final part of my short essay I try to offer some provisional remarks on the potential and mutually enriching dialogue between Shusterman’s somaesthetics and embodied, extended and enactive approaches to perception and mind, such as those, for example, of contemporary theorists like Andy Clark, Shaun Gallagher and Alva Noë.