Climate geoengineering might reduce the economic and ecological impacts of global warming. However, its governance is challenging: since climate preferences vary across countries, excessive climate geoengineering relative to the socially optimal level is a likely risk. Through a laboratory experiment on a public good-or-bad game, we study to what extent side payments can curb geoengineering efforts and restore efficiency. Although the availability of side payments is theoretically effective, its impact is modest in the experiment, especially in a multilateral setup. Replacing unstructured bilateral agreements with a structured framework improves outcomes.

Riccardo Ghidoni, A.L.A. (2023). Governing climate geoengineering: Side-payments are not enough. JOURNAL OF THE ASSOCIATION OF ENVIRONMENTAL AND RESOURCE ECONOMISTS, 10(5), 1149-1177 [10.1086/724286].

Governing climate geoengineering: Side-payments are not enough

Riccardo Ghidoni
Primo
;
Marco Casari;
2023

Abstract

Climate geoengineering might reduce the economic and ecological impacts of global warming. However, its governance is challenging: since climate preferences vary across countries, excessive climate geoengineering relative to the socially optimal level is a likely risk. Through a laboratory experiment on a public good-or-bad game, we study to what extent side payments can curb geoengineering efforts and restore efficiency. Although the availability of side payments is theoretically effective, its impact is modest in the experiment, especially in a multilateral setup. Replacing unstructured bilateral agreements with a structured framework improves outcomes.
2023
Riccardo Ghidoni, A.L.A. (2023). Governing climate geoengineering: Side-payments are not enough. JOURNAL OF THE ASSOCIATION OF ENVIRONMENTAL AND RESOURCE ECONOMISTS, 10(5), 1149-1177 [10.1086/724286].
Riccardo Ghidoni, Anna Lou Abatayo, Valentina Bosetti, Marco Casari, Massimo Tavoni
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Utilizza questo identificativo per citare o creare un link a questo documento: https://hdl.handle.net/11585/947395
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