This paper aims to investigate the ways in which electoral laws affect individually and territorially centred representation in the Italian parliament. The idea that several features of electoral systems affect the incentives for parties and voters to select legislators based on their personal attributes and linkages to the constituency of election has been first proposed by Carey and Shugart (1995) and then empirically tested by Shugart et al. (2005) with data from six European countries adopting different versions of proportional representation (PR) systems. We will replicate this study applying Shugart’s model to the crucial Italian case. Italy can be regarded as a crucial case for at least two reasons. First, a diachronical analysis allows us to include two major electoral reforms (1993 and 2005) and three different electoral proportional systems: pre-1994 (PR system with open lists and large M); 1994-2001 (a PR system with closed lists and small M as one of the two tiers in a parallel mixed-member system); post-2001 (PR system with closed lists and large M). Second, Italian data show significant differences from what the existing model predicts. This suggests that theory should be revised and important variables should be included in the framework.

Looking for Locals? Electoral reforms and intraparty competition in Italy

MARANGONI, FRANCESCO;TRONCONI, FILIPPO
2009

Abstract

This paper aims to investigate the ways in which electoral laws affect individually and territorially centred representation in the Italian parliament. The idea that several features of electoral systems affect the incentives for parties and voters to select legislators based on their personal attributes and linkages to the constituency of election has been first proposed by Carey and Shugart (1995) and then empirically tested by Shugart et al. (2005) with data from six European countries adopting different versions of proportional representation (PR) systems. We will replicate this study applying Shugart’s model to the crucial Italian case. Italy can be regarded as a crucial case for at least two reasons. First, a diachronical analysis allows us to include two major electoral reforms (1993 and 2005) and three different electoral proportional systems: pre-1994 (PR system with open lists and large M); 1994-2001 (a PR system with closed lists and small M as one of the two tiers in a parallel mixed-member system); post-2001 (PR system with closed lists and large M). Second, Italian data show significant differences from what the existing model predicts. This suggests that theory should be revised and important variables should be included in the framework.
Atti della 5a General Conference dello European Consortium for Political Research, Potsdam, 10-12 settembre 2009
1
20
F. Marangoni; F. Tronconi
File in questo prodotto:
Eventuali allegati, non sono esposti

I documenti in IRIS sono protetti da copyright e tutti i diritti sono riservati, salvo diversa indicazione.

Utilizza questo identificativo per citare o creare un link a questo documento: https://hdl.handle.net/11585/94647
 Attenzione

Attenzione! I dati visualizzati non sono stati sottoposti a validazione da parte dell'ateneo

Citazioni
  • ???jsp.display-item.citation.pmc??? ND
  • Scopus ND
  • ???jsp.display-item.citation.isi??? ND
social impact