Uso poliziesco dell'intelligenza artificiale: gli insegnamenti del Bundesverfassungsgericht

The use of intelligence as a predictive policing tool is one of the most discussed and treated topics in recent legal literature, including the criminal law area. The majority of Italian scholars look to the US experience, from which certain interesting ideas come, taking into consideration of the pioneering role that has long characterised the technological evolution overseas. In this context, the judgement of the German court constitutes a noteworthy novelty for the civil law jurist. From the methodological point of view, the police use of artificial intelligence is thematised in the light of the criteria developed by the german constitutional culture on the fundamental rights of the individual and their possible limitations. The interest in preventing or repressing crimes of a certain severity must be balanced with a newly coined fundamental right: the right to informational self-determination. The police use of software that acquires, cross-references and analyses personal information present in databases must be subject to the rule of law, in compliance with the proportionality test. Although we are speaking of foreign laws, the arguments used in the examined judgement suggest remarkably useful reflections even for the Italian jurist.