This article shows that the EU has exerted uneven influence within the global regime complex in shadow banking. Why? We seek to explain the variation in the EU’s ability to exert influence across different elemental regimes—those on hedge funds and securitization—in the broader regime complex over time. In hedge funds regulation, the EU has pursued more stringent international rules, to no avail. In securitization, the EU has been more successful in promoting more lenient regulation at the international level. We focus on the EU’s internal cohesiveness (which can change over time) as the key explanatory variable.

Quaglia L., Spendzharova A. (2023). Explaining the EU’s Uneven Influence Across the International Regime Complex in Shadow Banking. POLITICS AND GOVERNANCE, 11(2), 6-16 [10.17645/pag.v11i2.6272].

Explaining the EU’s Uneven Influence Across the International Regime Complex in Shadow Banking

Quaglia L.
Primo
;
2023

Abstract

This article shows that the EU has exerted uneven influence within the global regime complex in shadow banking. Why? We seek to explain the variation in the EU’s ability to exert influence across different elemental regimes—those on hedge funds and securitization—in the broader regime complex over time. In hedge funds regulation, the EU has pursued more stringent international rules, to no avail. In securitization, the EU has been more successful in promoting more lenient regulation at the international level. We focus on the EU’s internal cohesiveness (which can change over time) as the key explanatory variable.
2023
Quaglia L., Spendzharova A. (2023). Explaining the EU’s Uneven Influence Across the International Regime Complex in Shadow Banking. POLITICS AND GOVERNANCE, 11(2), 6-16 [10.17645/pag.v11i2.6272].
Quaglia L.; Spendzharova A.
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Utilizza questo identificativo per citare o creare un link a questo documento: https://hdl.handle.net/11585/939383
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