The HTTPS protocol is commonly adopted to secure connections to websites, both to guarantee the server's authenticity and to protect the privacy of transmitted data. However, the computational load associated with the protocol's key exchange and encryption/decryption activities isn't negligible. Many trafficked websites must avoid using HTTPS for most of their pages, typically restricting its usage only to encrypting sensitive user data. This article illustrates how this common practice significantly reduces the possibility of detecting manipulations of the data stream by the client, thus exposing the user to potential man-in-the-middle attacks.
m. prandini, m. ramilli, w. cerroni, f. callegati (2010). Splitting the HTTPS Stream to Attack Secure Web Connections. IEEE SECURITY & PRIVACY, 8, 80-84 [10.1109/MSP.2010.190].
Splitting the HTTPS Stream to Attack Secure Web Connections
PRANDINI, MARCO;RAMILLI, MARCO;CERRONI, WALTER;CALLEGATI, FRANCO
2010
Abstract
The HTTPS protocol is commonly adopted to secure connections to websites, both to guarantee the server's authenticity and to protect the privacy of transmitted data. However, the computational load associated with the protocol's key exchange and encryption/decryption activities isn't negligible. Many trafficked websites must avoid using HTTPS for most of their pages, typically restricting its usage only to encrypting sensitive user data. This article illustrates how this common practice significantly reduces the possibility of detecting manipulations of the data stream by the client, thus exposing the user to potential man-in-the-middle attacks.I documenti in IRIS sono protetti da copyright e tutti i diritti sono riservati, salvo diversa indicazione.