Cooperatives, including those owned and run by workers (Workers Firms, WFs), compete with capitalist firms in oligopolistic industries (mixed oligopolies). We ra- tionalize several facts emerging from the empirical research as: the concern of WFs for their employment; the interplay between membership and workplace safeguard within WFs; the different reaction to shocks between WFs and capitalist enterprises. We do so by means of a new model of WFs’ short-run behavior in a mixed duopoly. We innovate in modelling the WF’s objective function by including both profits and employment, and characterize the resulting Nash equilibrium
Workers’ firm in mixed duopoly / Flavio Delbono; Diego Lanzi; Carlo Reggiani. - In: ECONOMIC MODELLING. - ISSN 0264-9993. - ELETTRONICO. - 122:(2023), pp. 106247.1-106247.10. [10.1016/j.econmod.2023.106247]
Workers’ firm in mixed duopoly
Flavio Delbono;Diego Lanzi;Carlo Reggiani
2023
Abstract
Cooperatives, including those owned and run by workers (Workers Firms, WFs), compete with capitalist firms in oligopolistic industries (mixed oligopolies). We ra- tionalize several facts emerging from the empirical research as: the concern of WFs for their employment; the interplay between membership and workplace safeguard within WFs; the different reaction to shocks between WFs and capitalist enterprises. We do so by means of a new model of WFs’ short-run behavior in a mixed duopoly. We innovate in modelling the WF’s objective function by including both profits and employment, and characterize the resulting Nash equilibrium| File | Dimensione | Formato | |
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