Anti-exceptionalism about logic: an overview

There is a common perception that logic as a discipline is exceptional, being epistem- ically, methodologically and metaphysically dissimilar from the recognised sciences. Whereas even the most fundamental laws of physics apply only to physical systems, those of logic are typically conceived as wholly general, applying to all domains and all entities. To this extent, logic is not concerned with the particular identity of any object or property. Indeed, logic is not concerned with the content of propositions at all, but only with their form. For this reason, the exceptionalist conception has it that logical laws are both analytic and necessary, in not being responsive to the peculiar- ities of events in the actual world. Furthermore, on the basis of these considerations, logical laws must be knowable in a wholly different fashion to those of mathematics and the empirical sciences. While in mathematics and the sciences we often presume the validity of certain logical inferences in order to establish results, within logic we cannot do this without begging the question. Accordingly, justification for logic must be non-inferential. And, given that no observable states of affairs directly demonstrate that a rule of inference is valid, or a law true, in virtue of the justification for logic being non-inferential, it must also be a priori. This has led to the long-standing view that logical knowledge must either be a product of direct rational insight into the truths of logic or a result of epistemic analyticity. Last, but not least, logic is considered an exceptional discipline in that it is normative for reasoning, providing reasoners with normative guidance as to what to believe or disbelieve when reasoning. Thus, both in terms of its epistemology and the content of its laws, logic is significantly different from the (other) mathematical and empirical sciences. from the (other) mathematical and empirical sciences.