We investigate the efficiency and effectiveness consequences of emissions trading taxation. A theoretical partial equilibrium model is developed, showing that permits taxation distorts the equilibrium price and abatement efforts. Potentially counterintuitive conclusions concerning the tax revenue are also derived. A CGE model complements theoretical results, suggesting that the change in the equilibrium permits price brought about by taxation can be significant. Finally, we conclude that policy design based on cost effectiveness might lead to wrong conclusions: the socially desirable design of emissions trading taxation requires homogenous tax fates applied to net sellers and no rebate rates allowed for net buyers. (C) 2013 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
Valeria Costantini, Alessio D'Amato, Chiara Martini, Maria Cristina Tommasino, Edilio Valentini, Mariangela Zoli (2013). Taxing international emissions trading. ENERGY ECONOMICS, 40, 609-621 [10.1016/j.eneco.2013.07.019].
Taxing international emissions trading
Maria Cristina Tommasino;
2013
Abstract
We investigate the efficiency and effectiveness consequences of emissions trading taxation. A theoretical partial equilibrium model is developed, showing that permits taxation distorts the equilibrium price and abatement efforts. Potentially counterintuitive conclusions concerning the tax revenue are also derived. A CGE model complements theoretical results, suggesting that the change in the equilibrium permits price brought about by taxation can be significant. Finally, we conclude that policy design based on cost effectiveness might lead to wrong conclusions: the socially desirable design of emissions trading taxation requires homogenous tax fates applied to net sellers and no rebate rates allowed for net buyers. (C) 2013 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.I documenti in IRIS sono protetti da copyright e tutti i diritti sono riservati, salvo diversa indicazione.
