Détente, entente, or linkage? : the Helsinki Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe in U.S. relations with the Soviet Union

The CSCE was long considered a diplomatic parade celebrating previous substantial agreements between East and West. In recent years, many scholars re-assessing the significance of the CSCE from political, historical, or juridical viewpoints have demonstrated that each country participating in the CSCE assigned the conference a specific role in its foreign policy. In the case of the United States, the Helsinki CSCE appears to be marginal and mostly considered in relation to two general goals: the strengthening of NATO solidarity and cohesion on the one hand, and improvement of the relationship with the Soviet Union on the other. Although attention to the Atlantic solidarity was present throughout the preparation and the negotiations, archival sources show that the White House’s main criterion in tailoring the CSCE policy was the relationship with the Kremlin. The CSCE may be seen as an instrument of U.S. détente, as well as Strategic Arms Limitation Treaties (SALT) or trade and cooperation agreements. It has even been seen as an occasion of entente between the superpowers. This article argues that the CSCE may be considered as a case of application of the linkage theory that characterized the Nixon-Kissinger administration.