In this paper, we compare deterrence, settlement, and litigation spending under adversarial and inquisitorial systems. We present a basic litigation model with three sequential stages—care, settlement, litigation—and we test the predictions on experimental data. In line with our theoretical expectations, we fnd that, compared with the adversarial system, the inquisitorial system is associated with lower litigation spending, lower rates of cases settled, and tends to strengthen deterrence
Guerra, A., Maraki, M., Massenot, B., Thöni, C. (2023). Deterrence, settlement, and litigation under adversarial versus inquisitorial systems. PUBLIC CHOICE, 196(3-4), 331-356 [10.1007/s11127-022-01001-4].
Deterrence, settlement, and litigation under adversarial versus inquisitorial systems
Guerra, Alice
Primo
;
2023
Abstract
In this paper, we compare deterrence, settlement, and litigation spending under adversarial and inquisitorial systems. We present a basic litigation model with three sequential stages—care, settlement, litigation—and we test the predictions on experimental data. In line with our theoretical expectations, we fnd that, compared with the adversarial system, the inquisitorial system is associated with lower litigation spending, lower rates of cases settled, and tends to strengthen deterrenceFile | Dimensione | Formato | |
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