I present a novel strategy to account for two thoughts concerning disagreements about taste: (i) that they need not involve any substantive fault (faultlessness); and (ii) that the faultlessness of a contrary opinion can be coherently appreciated from within a committed perspective (parity). Under the assumption that judgements of taste are truth-apt and governed by the truth-norm, I argue that understanding how exactly truth is normative offers a strategy for accounting for both thoughts. I distinguish between different ways in which truth governs judgement to substantiate the thesis that truth's normative function varies according to the subject matter at issue. I then argue that truth's normative guidance in the domain of taste is characteristically weak. I introduce an intuitive distinction between basic and refined taste, and show how this distinction affects questions of faultlessness and parity. Last, I discuss the idea of alethic suberogation in connection with disagreement about refined taste.
Disagreement about Taste and Alethic Suberogation / Ferrari Filippo. - In: THE PHILOSOPHICAL QUARTERLY. - ISSN 0031-8094. - ELETTRONICO. - 66:264(2016), pp. 516-535. [10.1093/pq/pqv116]
Disagreement about Taste and Alethic Suberogation
Ferrari Filippo
2016
Abstract
I present a novel strategy to account for two thoughts concerning disagreements about taste: (i) that they need not involve any substantive fault (faultlessness); and (ii) that the faultlessness of a contrary opinion can be coherently appreciated from within a committed perspective (parity). Under the assumption that judgements of taste are truth-apt and governed by the truth-norm, I argue that understanding how exactly truth is normative offers a strategy for accounting for both thoughts. I distinguish between different ways in which truth governs judgement to substantiate the thesis that truth's normative function varies according to the subject matter at issue. I then argue that truth's normative guidance in the domain of taste is characteristically weak. I introduce an intuitive distinction between basic and refined taste, and show how this distinction affects questions of faultlessness and parity. Last, I discuss the idea of alethic suberogation in connection with disagreement about refined taste.I documenti in IRIS sono protetti da copyright e tutti i diritti sono riservati, salvo diversa indicazione.