Physiology of Taste and Intentionality in John Blund’s Tractatus De Anima

In the beginning of the thirteenth century, the circulation of Aristotle’s natural philosophy books deeply changed the ways in which the relationships between soul and body, mind, as well as the physical world were perceived. The discussions concerning cognition focused on how man, characterized by bodily nature, can engage in the cognitive process until the stage in which it becomes immaterial. Blund firmly claims the right of natural philosophy (and Masters of Arts) to deal with the nature of the soul, from both physical and metaphysical points of view: in order to clarify its accidental relationship to the body regarding the former; in order to elucidate its aspect as a separate, individual substance with respect to the latter. At the same time, Blund assigns to theologians the task of delving into the soul’s supernatural ends. His analysis proves to be highly original in its description of the relationships and boundaries between soul and body. This is especially true of Blund’s analysis of the two apparently secondary senses, touch and taste, both involved in the physiology and perception of flavours. In his analysis of the senses, Blund distinguishes: (i) external bodies; (ii) the production of sensitive images; (iii) their reception and transmission; and (iv) the perception of such bodily modification. In particular, this last point depends on the intentional activity of the soul and, mostly, it is at this level that the boundary is drawn between an externalist ontology of things and sense organs and an internalist ontology self-based on the intentional status of soul.