This commentary focuses on Machery's eliminativist claim, that concept ought to be eliminated from the theoretical vocabulary of psychology because it fails to denote a natural kind. I argue for the more traditional view that concepts are a functional kind, which provides the simplest account of the empirical evidence discussed by Machery. Copyright © Cambridge University Press 2010.
LALUMERA, E. (2010). Concepts are a functional kind. BEHAVIORAL AND BRAIN SCIENCES, 33(2-3), 217-218 [10.1017/S0140525X10000403].
Concepts are a functional kind
LALUMERA, ELISABETTA
2010
Abstract
This commentary focuses on Machery's eliminativist claim, that concept ought to be eliminated from the theoretical vocabulary of psychology because it fails to denote a natural kind. I argue for the more traditional view that concepts are a functional kind, which provides the simplest account of the empirical evidence discussed by Machery. Copyright © Cambridge University Press 2010.File in questo prodotto:
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