This commentary focuses on Machery's eliminativist claim, that concept ought to be eliminated from the theoretical vocabulary of psychology because it fails to denote a natural kind. I argue for the more traditional view that concepts are a functional kind, which provides the simplest account of the empirical evidence discussed by Machery. Copyright © Cambridge University Press 2010.
Concepts are a functional kind / LALUMERA, ELISABETTA. - In: BEHAVIORAL AND BRAIN SCIENCES. - ISSN 0140-525X. - STAMPA. - 33:2-3(2010), pp. 217-218. [10.1017/S0140525X10000403]
Concepts are a functional kind
LALUMERA, ELISABETTA
2010
Abstract
This commentary focuses on Machery's eliminativist claim, that concept ought to be eliminated from the theoretical vocabulary of psychology because it fails to denote a natural kind. I argue for the more traditional view that concepts are a functional kind, which provides the simplest account of the empirical evidence discussed by Machery. Copyright © Cambridge University Press 2010.File in questo prodotto:
Eventuali allegati, non sono esposti
I documenti in IRIS sono protetti da copyright e tutti i diritti sono riservati, salvo diversa indicazione.
