The legal nature of digital agents is considered, and it is argued that it is possible to attribute to such artificial entities intentional (mental) states that are legally relevant. Consequently we may recognise their legal capacity to act as representative of their users, and the users' power to delegate them the performance of cognitive tasks. The implications in various areas of the law is then discussed.
g. sartor (2009). Cognitive Automata and the Law: Electronic Contracting and the Intentionality of Software Agents. ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE AND LAW, 17, 190-253.
Cognitive Automata and the Law: Electronic Contracting and the Intentionality of Software Agents
SARTOR, GIOVANNI
2009
Abstract
The legal nature of digital agents is considered, and it is argued that it is possible to attribute to such artificial entities intentional (mental) states that are legally relevant. Consequently we may recognise their legal capacity to act as representative of their users, and the users' power to delegate them the performance of cognitive tasks. The implications in various areas of the law is then discussed.File in questo prodotto:
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