Moritz Schlick e il problema dell'intuizione nel Neopositivismo

According to Moritz Schlick – the one who established, in the first half of the twenties of the last century, a discussion group culminating with the Vienna Circle – intuition and “content” are inexpressible and cannot give rise to any knowledge. “Knowing” (Erkennen) does not imply direct contact, possession or fusion with the object, but the comparative recognition of something as something else. He therefore clearly separates the a priori analytic propositions, which are formal and tautological, that is, of a grammatical character, from the a posteriori (material) synthetic cognitive propositions, leaving no room for the synthetic a priori and criticizing the “material apriori” of Husserl’s phenomenology. However, in the last period of his thought, Schlick introduces the “observational propositions”, which express the immediate ba-sis of all empirical knowledge. In this way, Schlick seems to admit the possibility of an intuition as a “source” of knowledge and as a foundation of the very formal truths, stimulating a discussion on the “problem of intuition” within the Neopositivism and Logical empiricism in which, in particular, Hans Hahn and Kurt Reidemeister will take part.