Les parallèles convergentes. Objets et valeurs dans l’éthique phénoménologique d’Edmund Husser

ln the most recent debate of phenomenological as well as analytical provenance, Husserl's reflection, although pioneer regarding ethics, seems to suffer of a general depreciation enrooted in bis supposed ex:ess rationalism. The husserlian ethics would remain subjected to the dominance of a logico-objectifying reason, which appears to be the fundamental dimension of intentionality. The wide range of life-experiences would then be crushed by the hegemony of objectifying acts. Are we really sure? Our contribution will rather consist in ra!sing the originality of Husserl's method which lastly to reconcile_two seemingly contradictory requirements: the autonomy of ethical and its dependance towards logical reason. We shall notice thus a progressive d1ssociat1on from Brentano's teaching leading to an overall revision of intentionality. If such as rationalism exists in Husserl's thinking, it can only be asserted on the condition of a radical criticism of the concept of "representation" - from where, as we shall see, emerges a newly articulated relationship between "object" and "value".