Markets are being populated with new generations of pricing algorithms, powered with Artificial Intelligence, that have the ability to autonomously learn to operate. This ability can be both a source of efficiency and cause of concern for the risk that algorithms autonomously and tacitly learn to collude. In this paper we explore recent developments in the economic literature and discuss implications for policy.

Autonomous algorithmic collusion: Economic research and policy implications

Emilio Calvano;Giacomo Calzolari;Vincenzo Denicolò;Sergio Pastorello;
2021

Abstract

Markets are being populated with new generations of pricing algorithms, powered with Artificial Intelligence, that have the ability to autonomously learn to operate. This ability can be both a source of efficiency and cause of concern for the risk that algorithms autonomously and tacitly learn to collude. In this paper we explore recent developments in the economic literature and discuss implications for policy.
2021
Stephanie Assad, Emilio Calvano, Giacomo Calzolari, Robert Clark, Vincenzo Denicolò, Daniel Ershov, Justin Johnson, Sergio Pastorello, Andrew Rhodes, Lei Xu, Matthijs Wildenbeest
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Utilizza questo identificativo per citare o creare un link a questo documento: https://hdl.handle.net/11585/832502
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