This paper focuses on social dilemma games in which players may or may not meet the same partner again in the future. A novel prisoner's dilemma experiment, a meta-analysis of public goods experiments, and a meta-analysis of previous prisoner's dilemma experiments document high cooperation rates if the likelihood to meet the same partner again in the future is high.
Perfect and imperfect strangers in social dilemmas / Ghidoni R.; Cleave B.L.; Suetens S.. - In: EUROPEAN ECONOMIC REVIEW. - ISSN 0014-2921. - ELETTRONICO. - 116:(2019), pp. 148-159. [10.1016/j.euroecorev.2019.04.002]
Perfect and imperfect strangers in social dilemmas
Ghidoni R.Co-primo
;Suetens S.Co-primo
2019
Abstract
This paper focuses on social dilemma games in which players may or may not meet the same partner again in the future. A novel prisoner's dilemma experiment, a meta-analysis of public goods experiments, and a meta-analysis of previous prisoner's dilemma experiments document high cooperation rates if the likelihood to meet the same partner again in the future is high.File in questo prodotto:
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