A new definition of lying is gaining traction, according to which you lie only if you say what you know to be false. Drawing inspiration from “New Evil Demon” scenarios, I present a battery of counterexamples against this “Knowledge Account” of lying. Along the way, I comment upon the methodology of conceptual analysis, the moral implications of the Knowledge Account, and its ties with knowledge-first epistemology
Lying: knowledge or belief? / Neri Marsili. - In: PHILOSOPHICAL STUDIES. - ISSN 0031-8116. - STAMPA. - N/AD:(2021), pp. N/AD-N/AD. [10.1007/s11098-021-01713-1]
Lying: knowledge or belief?
Neri Marsili
2021
Abstract
A new definition of lying is gaining traction, according to which you lie only if you say what you know to be false. Drawing inspiration from “New Evil Demon” scenarios, I present a battery of counterexamples against this “Knowledge Account” of lying. Along the way, I comment upon the methodology of conceptual analysis, the moral implications of the Knowledge Account, and its ties with knowledge-first epistemologyFile in questo prodotto:
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