U.S. states increasingly require identification to vote – an ostensive attempt to deter fraud that prompts complaints of selective disenfranchisement. Using a difference-in-differences design on a 1.6-billion-observations panel dataset, 2008–2018, we find that the laws have no negative effect on registration or turnout, overall or for any group defined by race, gender, age, or party affiliation. These results hold through a large number of specifications. Our most demanding specification controls for state, year, and voter fixed effects, along with state and voter time-varying controls. Based on this specification, we obtain point estimates of -0.1 percentage points for effects both on overall registration and turnout (with 95 percent confidence intervals of [-2.3; 2.1 pp] and [-3.0; 2.8 pp], respectively), and +1.4 pp for the effect on the turnout of nonwhite voters relative to whites (with a 95 percent confidence interval of [-0.5; 3.2 pp]). The lack of negative impact on voter turnout cannot be attributed to voters’ reaction against the laws, measured by campaign contributions and self-reported political engagement. However, the likelihood that nonwhite voters were contacted by a campaign increases by 4.7 percentage points, suggesting that parties’ mobilization might have offset modest effects of the laws on the participation of ethnic minorities. Finally, strict ID requirements have no effect on fraud – actual or perceived. Overall, our findings suggest that efforts to improve elections may be better directed at other reforms.
Cantoni, E., Pons, V. (2021). Strict ID Laws Don’t Stop Voters: Evidence from a U.S. Nationwide Panel, 2008–2018*. QUARTERLY JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS, 136(4), 2615-2660 [10.1093/qje/qjab019].
Strict ID Laws Don’t Stop Voters: Evidence from a U.S. Nationwide Panel, 2008–2018*
Cantoni, Enrico;Pons, Vincent
2021
Abstract
U.S. states increasingly require identification to vote – an ostensive attempt to deter fraud that prompts complaints of selective disenfranchisement. Using a difference-in-differences design on a 1.6-billion-observations panel dataset, 2008–2018, we find that the laws have no negative effect on registration or turnout, overall or for any group defined by race, gender, age, or party affiliation. These results hold through a large number of specifications. Our most demanding specification controls for state, year, and voter fixed effects, along with state and voter time-varying controls. Based on this specification, we obtain point estimates of -0.1 percentage points for effects both on overall registration and turnout (with 95 percent confidence intervals of [-2.3; 2.1 pp] and [-3.0; 2.8 pp], respectively), and +1.4 pp for the effect on the turnout of nonwhite voters relative to whites (with a 95 percent confidence interval of [-0.5; 3.2 pp]). The lack of negative impact on voter turnout cannot be attributed to voters’ reaction against the laws, measured by campaign contributions and self-reported political engagement. However, the likelihood that nonwhite voters were contacted by a campaign increases by 4.7 percentage points, suggesting that parties’ mobilization might have offset modest effects of the laws on the participation of ethnic minorities. Finally, strict ID requirements have no effect on fraud – actual or perceived. Overall, our findings suggest that efforts to improve elections may be better directed at other reforms.File | Dimensione | Formato | |
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20210513_StrictIDlaws_merged_copyright.pdf
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